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Introduction
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) awarded the right to host
the 1936 Olympic Games to Berlin before the Nazis came to power in
1933. The politicians of Germany’s democratic and liberal Weimar
Republic (1918–1933) had hoped to celebrate the emergence of a demo-
cratic German state and its re-admittance to the European community
of nations after its isolation in the aftermath of the First World War.
Instead Adolf Hitler and Josef Göbbels, his Propaganda Minister, used
the Games to celebrate the ongoing destruction of that system, to
improve their international reputation and to substantiate their claims
of racial superiority. Ironically, the four gold medals won by the black
American athlete Jesse Owens revealed the Nazi’s doctrine of the morally
and physically superior Aryan race as obviously mistaken. Despite this,
most contemporary commentators view the 1936 Olympics as “one of
the great public relations coups of all time” (Coe et al., 1992: p. 127).
Houlihan argues that “Hitler and the Nazi Olympics showed just how
pliable sport was during the Berlin Games where almost every aspect
of the Games was manipulated to enhance the prestige of the Third
Reich and national socialism (1994: p. 11). Horne et al. (1999) suggest
that the “politicisation of the modern Olympics took a quantum leap
in 1936 with the staging of the 11th Olympiad in Berlin” (p. 194).
In Stalinist Russia at the same time, i.e. in the late 1920s and early
1930s, the politicization of sport and physical culture was very different.
Young people were given educational and recreational opportunities in
order to improve the quality of their lives and, more importantly, to forge
their Socialist consciousness and strengthen loyalty to party, state and
leader. Involvement of Russian athletes in international competitions
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was, however, very limited as Soviet sportsmen and women could only
compete with athletes of the ‘Red Sport International’ that had been
founded in 1922 as a branch of the ‘Komintern’ (the Communist Inter-
national). This self-imposed isolation of the Soviet Union made it difficult
for the country to use international sport competitions as an ideological
and political weapon in international relations. Since the Soviet Union
regarded itself as a progressive society, qualitatively very different from
Capitalist societies, participation and excellence in physical culture and
sport were frequently on the agenda of the most influential political
committees. One outcome of these intense ideological deliberations was
a clear rejection of the Capitalist concept of sport which was believed
to be an alienating experience for the individuals involved due to the
exaggerated importance of competitiveness, the achievement principle,
individualism, winning, and the resulting hierarchies — all embodying
the spirit of Capitalism. As physical education was recognized as a
powerful tool and a constituent component of Communist education
the development of sport groups, communities and clubs, usually re-
ferred to as ‘Physical Culture Collectives’, was widely promoted. From
the late 1920s the state increasingly took charge of all physical culture
affairs encouraging physical hygiene, discipline and training of the
Socialist body and promoting an alternative model to bourgeois sport.
Parallel with the Sixth Congress of the ‘Comintern’ in 1928 the Soviet
Union hosted its first major international sport event, the ‘Spartakiad’,
in Moscow. The intention of this event was to show how far Russian
athletes had progressed, to display the revolutionary nature of the
country’s physical culture system and to publicly question the values
underpinning the Olympic Games that were held at the same time in
Amsterdam. The Soviet ‘Spartakiades’ were “to be distinguished from
the Olympics by the inclusion of military events, folk dances and
noncompetitive pageants”, although “the core of the program … was
the same as that of the Olympics” (Edelmann, 1993: p. 38). A full tourism
and cultural programme was provided for the visiting worker athletes,
including excursions to the countryside and guided tours of factories,
schools, hospitals and other institutions representing the achievements
of the Russian revolution. The image presented was one of “a happy
people living in an almost perfect society driven by powerful collectivist
and internationalist feelings together with a strong identification with
the political system” (Arnoud and Riordan, 1998: pp. 197–8). Surpris-
ingly, a small number of Western journalists attended the 1928 ‘Sparta-
kiad’ that provided a rare glimpse of Soviet sport to the outside world.
Furthermore, every year young athletes from all over the Soviet Union
would march on May Day and saluting their leaders and declaring their
allegiance. These theatrically orchestrated ‘Physical Culture Days’
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Illustration 1/2 The two Kims are everywhere — portraits of Kim Il Sung
and Kim Jong Il: (above) in private spaces and (below) in
public, as this rendition in mosaic tiles
[Note: all photographs in this chapter were taken by Udo Merkel]
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comprised elaborate parades through Moscow’s Red Square as well as
“mass gymnastic displays, bizarre and idiosyncratic floats, and omni-
present portraits of Stalin” (Edelmann, 1993: p. 43). All these scripted
mass events offered a conceptual and practical alternative to the ‘bour-
geois’ multi-sport events of the Olympic movement: togetherness and
discipline highlighted a healthy sense of self firmly based in a strong
and coherent community without sacrificing participants’ individuality.
Eventually, along with the Soviet Union itself, these alternative ‘sport’
events disappeared from the face of the earth with the sole exception
of North Korea where they did not only survive but most recently have
experienced an unprecedented second blossoming.
Like the political elite of the former Soviet Union, the North Korean
regime has always taken “great pride in its truly awesome choreographed
mass marches through the great central square in Pyongyang, with
literally a million people marching in step in fifty parallel columns”
(Cumings, 2004: p. 137). Since 1946, the country has also more or less
regularly staged mass gymnastic games. However, since the beginning
of this millennium, these performances have grown grander, more lavish
and prominent, and have attracted international media and tourist
attention1. “True to the North’s way of doing nothing by half, it dwarfs
anything seen even during the heyday of the far more prosperous com-
munist regimes of the former eastern bloc” (Watts, 2002).
Prior to the detailed analysis of these mass games the next section
will briefly summarise significant socio-historical, economic, and political
milestones in recent Korean history that have shaped the current
experiences and existence of the North Korean nation. Of particular
importance, obviously, is the division of the Korean people and the
ongoing debates about reunification.
Living in a Cold War Museum
Korea’s2 annexation by Japan lasted from 1910 to1945. Subsequently,
American and Soviet troops occupied the country and helped establish
governments sympathetic to their respective ideologies and leaders,
ultimately resulting in the current political division and the existence
of two Korean states: the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south, founded
15 August 1948, hosting a population of 48 million, and the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north, established three weeks
later on 9 September1948, with 23 million people. Shortly after the two
superpowers pulled out most of their forces, North Korea invaded South
Korea starting the Korean War (1950–1953)3. After a truce was signed
with the North, a demilitarized zone (DMZ) was established along the
thirty-eighth parallel and has separated the two countries from conflict
Pyongyang Proudly Presents: Mass Displays…in North Korea 5
since. The two countries never signed a peace treaty (Blair, 1987; Cum-
ings, 2005: 139–298; Zhang, 1995).
In the six decades since Korea was divided much has changed. The
economic miracle in South Korea is well documented and widely studied
(Hwang, 1993; Ogle, 1990; Woo, 1991). Following the Japanese model
of export-oriented growth, production grew dramatically in the 1970s
and 1980s and the South still maintains an annual average real growth
rate of over five percent (Amsden, 1989). Despite a severe recession
following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, South Korea today enjoys a
robust and healthy economy (Cumings, 2005: pp. 299–341).
The Japanese occupation of Korea in the first half of the twentieth
century left the North with greater industrial capacity, but much of this
was destroyed by the Korean War. During the Cold War, the North
frequently exploited the animosities between its two main benefactors,
the Soviet Union and China, and achieved astonishing progress in
standards of living. However, since the demise of the Soviet Union things
have changed for the worse: most of the markets for North Korean
products have all but disappeared. In addition, famines have repeatedly
swept through the country in recent years, caused by a combination
of unfortunate weather conditions and inadequate agricultural man-
agement policies. Aid agencies have estimated that up to two million
people have died since the mid 1990s because of acute food shortages.
While the South has continued to grow and now enjoys per capita GDP
on a par with those of many developed nations, the North has slowly
slid into poverty. South Korea trades heavily with the rest of the world,
whilst North Korea is isolated and its economy bears a remarkable
resemblance to the old Korea with its closed borders and reluctance to
deal with outsiders (Cumings, 2005: pp. 404–47). Largely responsible
for this is Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s “Eternal Leader”, who was driven
by the search for a pre-modern Korean ideal, an autarkic Hermit
Kingdom. Although Kim Il Sung died in 1994 and (after three years of
mourning) was replaced by his son, Kim Jong Il, the idea of self-suffi-
ciency, Juche, has remained one of the most important cornerstones
of the state’s ideology. Juche is often understood as a philosophical
concept describing a state of self-reliance. However, in the North Korean
context Juche is more accurately understood as political/ideological,
economic and military independence.
There have been no major ideological developments since Kim Jong
Il came to power in 1997, but his slightly more pragmatic policies have
led to the establishment of full diplomatic ties with a large number of
European countries as well as Canada, Australia and several others.
The North has also increased its efforts to seek foreign investment and
has developed a host of new laws facilitating Capitalist practices. It seems
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as if China has taught North Korea that rapid Capitalist growth is no
longer incompatible with a powerful central state. Great headway was
made in 2002 when Japan and North Korea established full diplomatic
ties. Relations with the USA under former President Bill Clinton also
improved considerably, but hit rock bottom after the more confronta-
tional George W. Bush came to power and placed North Korea on his
infamous ‘Axis of Evil’ list4. Most importantly, however, the greatest
diplomatic advances were with South Korea as Kim Dae Jung’s
innovative and pragmatic ‘Sunshine Policy’ favoured change through
dialogue, encouraged economic assistance, cultural exchanges and poli-
tical cooperation in order to normalise relations and ultimately to achieve
reunification5. North Korea’s overarching Juche policies of self-reliance
appear, in the new millenium, to be coming to an end. “Put in place to
insulate the nation against the disasters of colonialization, depression,
and war, they seem irrelevant now” (Cumings, 2005: p. 437). Having
kept a secure ideological distance from the Soviet Union and its Eastern
European allies, the country survived the collapse of the Soviet bloc
politically without any damage.
After the first ever inter-Korean summit between Kim Dae Jung
and Kim Jong Il in June 2000, debates about the reunification of the
divided Korean peninsula were reignited. Both Korean states proclaim
Illustration 3 Street propaganda
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eventual unification as a high priority political goal, and a united Korea
is an essential element of both Koreas’ political discourses. However,
there is widespread scepticism that this is going to happen in the
foreseeable future. First, the North’s and the South’s ideas about how
to achieve reunification and what the outcome would be are miles apart.
Second, the status quo of two co-existing Korean states is beneficial to
all parties concerned, not only to the two superpowers (China and the
USA) but most of all to the two Koreas6:
One remarkable feature of North Korea’s external environment
after the collapse of the socialist states in many parts of the
world is that all of the four surrounding powers — China, the
U.S., Russia and Japan — are against the collapse of the North.
Preoccupied with its domestic affairs and afraid of the negative
impact of North Korea’s sudden collapse on itself, each of them
is trying to help stabilize North Korea in one way or another.
(Hak, 1996: p. 27)
Considering that the two Koreas technically remain in a state of war
because their three-year conflict in the early 1950s ended in an armistice,
not a peace treaty, there has been some major progress over the last
decade which is partly driven by — and partly reflected in — the world
Illustration 4 A “high-tech” amusement park
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of sport. Prior to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics the two Koreas
marched together at various opening ceremonies of high-profile inter-
national events, repeatedly held ‘unification matches’ involving repre-
sentatives from both countries and organised several inter-Korean sport
exchanges (Merkel, 2008). These activities did not only “promote dÈtente
between the two Koreas” (Levermore and Budd, 2004: p. 3) but also
kept the highly emotional reunification issue in the public discourse
without the need to engage in complex and difficult political negotiations.
In November 2005, sport administrators from North and South
Korea agreed in principle to form a unified team for the Beijing Olympics
in order to take the symbolic reconciliation of the divided Korean people
one step further. After lengthy negotiations this did not happen due to
a fundamental disagreement on the selection of athletes (Cha, 2009:
pp. 42–43). Nevertheless, for many political commentators, the declar-
ation of intention itself represented a major breakthrough, another sign
that North Korea was edging out of its isolation, and a new milestone
for inter-Korean efforts to go one step further in their cooperation. North
Korea’s willingness to engage constructively with the South in discussing
sport matters (and gradually to abandon its isolationist politics) was,
however, undermined by two unfortunate events that caused a severe
Illustration 5 The reunification monument in the North Korean capital
Pyongyang
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deterioration of their political relationship. First, South Korea’s new presi-
dent, Lee Myung Bak, has taken a much tougher line than his liberal
predecessors Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Dae Jung. In fact, he has aban-
doned their successful ‘Sunshine Policy’, which favoured rapproche-
ment and engagement, and replaced it with his ‘Vision 3000’, which
ties economic aid and political cooperation to the denuclearisation of
the North. Second, the killing of a South Korean tourist by a North Kor-
ean soldier on 11 July 2008 in the South-East of North Korea was signifi-
cant. The 53–year-old woman was shot after wandering into a fenced-
off military area near the Mount Geumgang resort, a popular tourist
destination and symbol of cross-border reconciliation opened to South
Koreans in 1998. Subsequently the two countries did not even march
together at the Opening Ceremony of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing.
Tensions between North Korea and the rest of the world increased
again from the late 2008 onwards, and in April 2009 the country aban-
doned international talks aimed at ending its nuclear activities. Subse-
quently North Korea conducted a small number of nuclear tests which
the global community repeatedly condemned.
However, this is the conventional view of North Korea. Bruce Cum-
ings has suggested that there is an alternative way of thinking about
North Korea:
… as a small, Third World, postcolonial nation that has been
gravely wounded, first by forty years of Japanese colonialism
and then by another sixty years of national division and war,
and that is deeply insecure, threatened by the world around it.
And so it projects a fearsome image. This is the only post-
war communist state to have had its territory occupied by a
foreign army, in the fall and winter of 1950; the unrestrained
bombing campaign remains a heavy memory, and its weight
can still be felt in present-day North Korea. From time to time
one still senses the smell of death and nearness of evil. This
feeling also issues forth merely from looking at the careworn,
desolate faces of the older generation. … they suffered one of
the most appalling wars in an appallingly violent twentieth
century. (2004: pp. 151–152)
This paper will keep Cumings’ sensitive and sensible suggestion in mind
in order to develop an empathetic understanding (Max Weber) and to
see the world through the eyes of the North Korean state without aban-
doning a critical acuity. The research employed several primary research
methods (e.g. documentary analysis, interviews, participant observation)
which involved travelling to both South and North Korea. The latter
happened in September 2008 during the official celebrations of the 60th
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anniversary of the North Korean state. The focus was on policy
issues as well as the political contents and messages of two mass
spectacles, i.e. the Arirang Festival and a new show entitled ‘Prosper
our Motherland’. Both spectacles are part of a major propaganda offen-
sive on a scale that would make even big-spending Hollywood directors
envious.
North Korean-style mass spectacles and mega events
North Korea’s outdoor mass gymnastic games are usually staged in the
capital’s (Pyongyang) May Day stadium that can host up to 150,000
spectators. They consist of three distinctive components. First, a floor-
show of complex and highly choreographed group routines performed
by tens of thousands of gymnasts (with large artificial flowers, flags,
hoops, balls, ropes and clubs), acrobats (with poles, ladders, spring-
boards, trampolines and huge metal-framed wheels) and dancers. Fur-
thermore, the cast includes a military tattoo, hordes of waving, smiling
children, an aerial ballet by dancers on bungee ropes, thousands of
gymnasts, flying acrobats, and military personnel performing taekwondo
routines. Second, the backdrop, a giant human mosaic forming colour-
ful, elaborate and detailed panoramas of historical and contemporary
scenes, landscapes, architecture, portraits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong
Il, objects, slogans and cartoons. More than 20,000 school children (aged
between 13 and 15) hold up coloured cards that are part of a book
with a total of almost 200 pages. The children change them so quickly
and in complete unison that these images appear to be animated —
all synchronised to a humble video and laser light show. Third, the music
that provides the acoustic link between the backdrop and the performers
in the centre of the May Day stadium, ensuring a dynamic flow and
coherence of the performance.
As with all achievements in North Korea, ultimately responsible
for this exuberant artistic arrangement are the two Kims.
The Juche-oriented mass gymnastics of Korea originated from
Flower Gymnastics, a work President Kim Il Sung created in
1930, the early days of his anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle.
Today it represents the ideological theme of the history of the
country and nation… As Kim Jong Il pointed out in a meeting
with the mass gymnastics producers on April 11, 1987, the
Korean style of mass gymnastics is a mixed form of compre-
hensive physical exercises with a combination of high ideological
content, artistic quality and gymnastic skills. (Kim Song Mo,
2002: pp. 6–7)
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The result, organised in a set of distinct but coherent acts, combines
elements from physical theatre, rhythmic gymnastics, Cirque du Soleil
and Broadway musicals. The one-and-a-half hour shows are impressive,
energetic performances with no intermission. One cast of several
hundred performers flows off the field while the next flows onto it. The
colourful and imaginative costumes, a booming soundtrack and a
modest fireworks display improve the spectacle even further7. These
mass gymnastic games easily outclass the most incredible Olympic
opening ceremonies and the often glamorous half-time entertainment
of the American Superbowl. Although outside North Korea they are often
criticised as being nothing more than a blunt propaganda tool praising
the Communist state and its leaders, their meaning and significance
is much more complex and multi-layered.
These mass gymnastic games make full use of the impoverished
state’s last natural resource: the inexpensive labour of highly educated
and utterly obedient young people. Participation is not voluntary but
mandatory. All educational institutions in Pyongyang compete for a place
in the performances and go through an extended training and selection
programme8 which commences at least nine months before the actual
performances take place. Those young people participating in the
intensive daily training routines are excused from their classes. Since
many of the older students subsequently struggle to meet university
entry requirements, the North Korean education authorities have
introduced a system whereby these students receive additional points
to compensate for their participation in the performances. However, while
these students might struggle academically, there is little doubt that
they have learned something ideologically extremely important: to value
the power of collective efforts, ranking it higher than selfishness and
individual achievement.
The underlying rationale of these mass gymnastic games is to
produce committed young Communists through a combination of phy-
siological and psychological indoctrination. Long hours and months of
rigorous, often exhausting training help to instill and continually
reinforce an ideology that does not tolerate deviation: subordination of
the individual to the group, and the promotion of a single, unified
collective will and effort that is above any individual desires or self-
interest. This may seem oppressive and morally objectionable but, in
fact, it is generally considered an honour to be part of the mass games
and only the most talented are chosen to join. A South Korean journalist
and North Korea expert with whom I discussed the Arirang festival
argued that “what appears to be a kind of systematic indoctrination
and exploitation, inhuman and repugnant [but] for the thousands of
performers it is an honour to be chosen”.
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The expected multiple benefits of active participation in mass gym-
nastic performances are clearly outlined North Korea’s official sports
policy9:
Pupils should be encouraged to participate in mass gymnastic
performances. These are a form of comprehensive mass sport
and combine athletic techniques and ideological and artistic
content. They are very effective both in educating pupils in the
collectivist spirit and in building up their strength and improving
their artistic skills. By giving frequent gymnastic performances
of this type, pupils will contribute greatly to educating the work-
ing people and enhancing the prestige of the country abroad.
(Kim Jong Il, 1997: p. 5)
The grand scale of thousands of young people working with such militar-
istic precision and in complete unison, as though they were a single
body, reflects the ideological underpinning of North Korean society. It
emphasises the superiority of the group over the individual and demon-
strates to both participants and spectators how working together for
the common good can create such works of beauty and perfection.
There is little doubt about the popularity of these mass games
among the North Korean population. Cautious estimates suggest that
at least 8 million North Koreans attended the 200 or so performances
of the first three runs of the Arirang Festival (in 2002, 2005 and 2007):
that is approximately 40,000 spectators per show. On each of these
occasions the popular demand was so overwhelming that the shows
had to be extended for several weeks.
The artistic arrangements, colourful displays and political messages
of the 2002 and 2005 editions of the Arirang Festival were very much
the same with a few minor modifications reflecting new political realities.
In 2005, one brief sequence of the Arirang festival disappeared after
South Korean media complained about the divisive content. In the show,
three martial arts specialists from North Korea kicked, punched and
finally defeated 30 unnamed opponents. But there was a clue: the
uniforms of the ‘enemies’ were identical to those that had been used
by the South Korean armed forces before 1990. “Unification Ministry
and intelligence sources said the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il
watched the show Sunday and that his ‘on-the-scene inspection’ may
have triggered the cut” (Jong Ang Ilbo, 2005). This last-minute alteration
was widely regarded as another small gesture among many of the new
openness and confidence in evidence in North Korea.
Both festivals, in 2002 and 2005, attempted to prove North Korea
was not the evil place depicted by former US President George W. Bush.
However, there were also a few differences and changes. Firstly, a prime
motive for hosting the Arirang festival in 2002 was rivalry with the South
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— which, with Japan, at the same time co-hosted the FIFA World Cup.
Secondly, whilst the 2002 event was an almost exclusively North Korean
affair with only a handful of selected foreigners attending, in 2005 more
foreigners than ever before were allowed to witness this spectacle. Conse-
quently, “the festival brought official delegations from China, Russia
and Cuba as well as high ranking visitors from Mexico and a host of
other nations” (Cho and Faiol, 2005). Even Americans, in the public
and political discourse of North Korea still the arch enemies, were issued
with visas to enter North Korea. Along with a growing number of curious
Western spectators, in 2005 ordinary South Korean citizens were for
the first time allowed to fly directly from Seoul (Incheon) to Pyongyang
and attend the Arirang spectacle. Approximately 1,000 South Koreans
made the Arirang pilgrimage on overnight package tours. Kim Jong Il’s
reinvigorated ‘invitation diplomacy’, a political tool his father used to
exploit to great effect, was clearly intended to show how strong and
stable North Korea is, how firmly he is in control and how popular he
remains with the people. This message would not get out loud and clear
unless there were select groups of foreigners there to witness it.
So far, the most prominent spectators were the US Secretary of
State and the South Korean President. Bill Clinton’s foreign minister
Madeleine Albright visited North Korea in October 2000. The North
Korean authorities changed her itinerary at the last minute to include
a mass gymnastics show. The show Albright was treated to was entitled
‘The Invincible Worker’s Party’, a kind of predecessor of the Arirang
Festival. In 2007, following high-profile talks with Kim Jong Il, Roh Moo
Hyun, the South Korean president, enjoyed the Arirang performance.
“North Korea considerably modified its mass gymnastics and artistic
show by taking out parts that stress ideological loyalty and adding
content to honor visiting South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, who
watched it Wednesday night” (The Korea Times, 4 October 2007).
There were no high-profile visitors attending the 2008 events that
celebrated the 60th anniversary of the North Korean state. Return
visitors to North Korea to whom I spoke noted that anti-American
propaganda and slogans had been taken down in the capital. According
to one official from the North Korean Tourist Board, the country was
expecting about 8,000 Chinese visitors and several hundred Western
tourists, mostly from European countries. All of them obviously provide
some hard currency for the impoverished state. Ticket prices for the
two shows ranged from 50 to 100 Euros per performance. Only foreign
currencies were accepted, with Euros the preferred option. There were
some improvised souvenir stalls in the May Day stadium, where women
in traditional dress sold glossy programmes, posters, handmade dolls
and home-made DVDs with price tags in Euros and US dollars.
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Foreigners were encouraged to attend the mass gymnastic games but
not allowed to watch the military and people’s parade on the 9th
September10.
Around one million people are thought to have paraded through
Pyongyang. A state television broadcast monitored in Seoul
showed displays of armaments, legions of goose-stepping soldiers
and tens of thousands of North Koreans shouting praises to him
[Kim Il Sung] in unison, though some analysts thought it lower-
key than previous parades. (Branigan, 2008)
The 2008 edition of the Arirang Festival continued the tradition of
previous performances and followed their established pattern. The show
comprised six distinctive sections. It started with a ‘Grand Prelude’,
followed by four acts each with several scenes, and ended with a ‘Grand
Finale’. After the prelude, the first act was devoted to the ‘Arirang Nation’
comprising images of ‘crossing the river Tuman’, ‘the star of Korea’, ‘my
homeland’ and ‘our arms’. In the second act, entitled ‘Songun Arirang’,
the main theme continued to be Korean nationalism and the exalted
position of the North Korean army. Soldiers entered and dominated the
stadium floor while the backdrop featured a number of martial arts
images. North Korea’s Songun policy prioritizes the armed forces in state
and society and justifies the allocation of enormous national resources
to the military apparatus. North Korea has one of the world’s largest
standing armies with approximately one million soldiers. The third act
(‘Arirang of Happiness’) conveyed a number of political and economic
messages (e.g. ‘Modernisation and Information of the People’s Economy’
or ‘Science and Technology to the Highest Level!’) stressing the current
and future development of North Korean society. Finally, the issue of
Korean reunification was addressed in the fourth act (‘Arirang Reunifi-
cation’) whilst the ‘Grande Finale’ (‘Arirang of a Thriving Nation’) predicted
peace and prosperity for the whole peninsula should such an event
ever occur.
The ‘Prosper our Motherland’ show, which premiered in 2008, was
smaller (‘only’ an estimated 50,000 performers participated), staged in
the afternoon and celebrated 60 years of North Korean history. It
comprised five distinctive sections: a prelude, three acts and a finale
repeating some of the themes of the Arirang Festival — e.g. the second
act also focused on the hegemonic position (Songun) of the armed forces
in North Korean society. The first act was entitled ‘In the bosom of the
Great Leader’ and almost entirely devoted to the life of Kim Il Sung,
“the centre of humankind”, and his achievements, for example steer-
ing the process of rapid social change, the industrialization of the
country, the country’s surprising success at the 1966 Soccer World Cup
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in England as well as the establishment of the North Korean film
industry. The act finished with a backdrop reading “We are missing Kim
Il Sung”. The following section continued to praise North Korea as a
‘revolutionary motherland’, the ‘spirit of the brave soldiers’, ‘Taekwondo
as the spirit of a nation’ and the country’s Songun policy. The final
element of the second act was particularly popular with the local
spectators as it featured five-year old children on unicycles with large
balloons, which was accompanied by the audience’s loud chanting of
“man se, man se” (Korean for “hooray”).
The third act of the ‘Prosper our Motherland’ show and the fourth
act of the Arirang Festival were of particular significance for political
observers since they celebrated the recent improvements in inter-Korean
relations and symbolically ‘lived the dream’ of future reunification.
One segment that was used in both shows featured the ‘Reuni-
fication Train’ — a reference to a railway link across the DMZ that
was officially completed in June 2003. The line is only 27.5 kilometres
long but of great symbolic importance. Trains run daily to the Kaesong
Industrial Park north of the border where South Korean companies use
the North’s workforce to build their goods. The freight service eventually
began in December 2007. “But in the first ten months, it carried only
340 tons of goods, the operators said in a report to the Seoul parliament.
On 150 out of 163 return trips so far, it was a ghost train, carrying
nothing at all” (Spencer, 2008). This discrepancy between reality and
wishful thinking can also be found in several other images that created
colourful illusions, e.g. one of the Kims walking through a fertile and
healthy barley field, a panorama of a modern, high-tech industrial
complex, children working on modern computers, and a shopping basket
with fresh eggs, corn cobs, tinned pork and tuna. Most of these everyday
products were not available in shops in September 2008 when I visited
the country.
Less surreal but rather a direct political reminder for the South
were those backdrops that referred to two very significant dates in recent
Korean history that have become synonyms for inter-Korean progress:
15th June and 4th October. Whilst the latter makes reference to the
2007 treaty, the former refers to the joint declaration of 2000. Both
are political milestones in the Korean reunification process but have
not yet been fully implemented. In popular discourses, these dates have
been elevated to a mythical status. All North Koreans I spoke to appeared
to have a detailed understanding of the two treaties and use these dates
as abbreviations for complex political issues.
However, it is not only the impressive backdrop that communicates
political promises, messages and futures. It is also the performers in
the centre of the May Day stadium. They not only create aesthetically
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pleasing formations, such as blossoming flowers or intersecting geo-
metric shapes that expand, collapse and flow into each other, but they
also contribute significantly to the political character of these shows
and thus create a symbiosis of art, physical culture and ideology. The
themes of Korean division and unity also repeatedly occur as part of
the gymnastics display. One of the sets used in both shows depicted a
dramatic physical representation of the separation of the nation. A mass
of young people magically assemble into the perfect shape of the whole
Korean peninsula. Against the backdrop of some dramatic music, the
southern and northern halves of the peninsula inexorably drift asunder;
aching arms are outstretched in futility as unseen forces pull the two
halves apart. Subsequently, the backdrop created a montage of South
and North Korean children, while uttering the chant: “How much longer
do we have to be divided due to foreign forces?”.
The finales of both shows were forward looking. The last act of the
Arirang Festival was entitled ‘Arirang of a thriving nation’ and celebrated
peace and prosperity as the outcome of reunification of the Korean
people. Both the backdrop as well as performers in the centre of the
May Day stadium formed on various occasions the shape of the whole
Korean peninsula without the dividing line along the 38th parallel. The
‘Prosper our Motherland’ performance, however, avoided the reunification
issue and predicted ‘prosperity for the Socialist motherland’. Both shows
finished with a colourful display of the number 2012 when North Korea
intends to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung
with another mass gymnastic extravaganza11.
Both the Arirang Festival and the ‘Prosper our Motherland’ show
play an important part in North Korea’s domestic and foreign policy
agenda. They reinforce the religious cult of its rulers and are meant to
demonstrate the uniqueness and success of the country’s political
system, and to demonstrate the North’s commitment to reunification.
Recent economic and political developments have made it increasingly
difficult for North Korea to continue adhering to its Juche philosophy
of self-reliance. The desperate need for foreign currencies and a con-
tinuation of humanitarian aid to deal with the disastrous consequences
of years of inefficient agricultural production and extreme weather
conditions have opened up the country to foreigners, especially members
of international non-governmental organisations and, more recently,
to an increasing number of tourists. Although these events are a
public demonstration of North Korea’s pride and self-confidence, they
also celebrate Korean unity and keep the reunification issue in the
public discourse without the need to engage in difficult political
negotiations.
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Conclusion
North Korea’s contemporary mass gymnastic games, the Arirang Festival
and the ‘Prosper our Motherland’ show, are unique and grandiose,
ideological spectacles and contemporary reminders of the powerful and
lasting Soviet influences on the development of sport and physical culture
in various parts of the world. These Soviet-style displays of physical
culture involve the masses and fall outside the dominant ‘higher,
stronger, faster’ philosophy.
Due to the questionable reputation of North Korea’s ruling regime,
it has increasingly become important to initiate an alternative discourse
that would help generate international recognition in general and a
positive reputation in particular. Usually, the political benefits of isolated
countries participating in international sport events derive from the
association with successful athletes or teams. Possessing only very
limited resources and expertise, it is very unlikely that North Korea will
be able to produce an Asian ‘sports miracle’ and impress the rest of
the world with outstanding performances, athletes and teams, as for
example the former East-Germany did (Merkel 2009). Instead the
country’s political elite have promoted a remarkably different model for
the political exploitation of physical culture — one that is relatively
inexpensive and fulfills a number of functions domestically und
internationally. The sheer magnitude and exuberance of these mass
games is overwhelming, and the design and choreography is an
impressive visual feast.
In addition to entertainment and propaganda these mass games
provide the North Korean rulers with a rare and unrivalled opportunity
to present the usually secluded state to the rest of the world and to
showcase the strength and vigour of its Socialist system. For the North
Korean government this is an important symbolic gesture demonstrating
more openness and transparency. As well as underpinning the religious
cult of Kim Jong Il and his father, these two festivals are also part of a
wider international charm offensive. Kim Jong Il’s ‘invitation diplomacy’
intends to show how strong, stable and proud North Korea is, and how
popular he remains with the people. Furthermore, both shows are an
opportunity for Kim Jong Il to showcase his vision of an alternative
Socialist North Korea to the world since they place extreme emphasis
on group dynamics and collective efforts rather than individual prowess.
The reunification issue has consistently been the most prominent
theme in all the Arirang performances over the last decade. The new
‘Prosper our Motherland’ show went beyond the sentimental and emo-
tional celebration of Korean integrity and unity. The performance not
only highlighted a few of the visible achievements but also added some
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interesting details through explicit references to specific meetings and
treaties that were intended to drive the reunification of the two countries
forward but have not yet been fully put into action.
The shows are also a major hard currency earner for North Korea
as they attract increasing numbers of Chinese and Western tourists.
Visitors left the May Day stadium in Pyongyang with memories of a grand
and overwhelming show. In the words of one male Canadian spectator:
“It was a fantastic spectacle. I have never seen anything like this before
and I would have never expected such a degree of perfection. But it
was also scary” (9 September, 2008).
Whether these mass games can put North Korea back into the fold
of respectable nations remains an open question. However, there is a
strong likelihood that these displays will soon become hallmark events
of international status, providing the host community with unrivaled
prominence on the global stage of mass spectacle.
Notes
1 A recent google search (30 July 2009) for “mass games North Korea”
resulted in 805,000 hits; many of these websites containing images.
Furthermore, youtube hosts a large number of fairly short clips of the
mass games.
2 Whenever the term ‘Korea’ is used, it refers to the Korean nation and
peninsula as a whole, deliberately ignoring the political division.
3 The North disagrees with this view of history as they argue that the
South, in conjunction with the USA, started the Korean War. In fact,
in North Korea this conflict is referred to as the “Victorious Fatherland
Liberation War”. Most experts, however, agree that the Korean War
was a failed attempt by the North to reunite the divided country.
4 At the end of the same year, the movie Die Another Day was released.
Pierce Brosnan’s last mission as British agent James Bond starts off
in North Korea with a high-speed hovercraft chase through the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas. Bond is captured
and subjected to vicious North Korean torture before being released
in exchange for prisoners, amongst these Zao, a North Korean high-
calibre villain. Bond’s mission to track down Zao and his accomplice,
the British billionaire Gustav Graves, takes him to Hong Kong, Cuba,
London, Iceland and back to the divided Korean peninsula, leading
to a violent and destructive showdown as a laser cannon is fired to
slice open a gigantic corridor through the DMZ in order to facilitate a
Northern invasion of the South.
5 In June 2000, the South Korean president Kim Dae Jung participated
in the first North-South presidential summit with North Korea’s leader
Kim Jong Il, which later led to his winning the Nobel Peace Price. The
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committee justified the decision in this way: “For his work for democracy
and human rights in South Korea and in East Asia in general, and
for peace and reconciliation with North Korea in particular”.
6 Japan does not support Korean reunification either. A unified Korean
peninsula would form an influential political force in East Asia and
also be a powerful economic competitor in the global market, which
Japan in particular would have to fear.
7 The Arirang Festival is in fact recognised by the Guinness Book of World
Records as the “largest gymnastic and artistic performance”.
8 Daniel Gordon’s fantastic documentary entitled “A State Of Mind” (2003)
follows two North Korean schoolgirls, aged 11 and 13, and their families
for over eight months as they prepare for the mass games. The film
reveals a rare but detailed glimpse into North Korean society and culture
as well as the discipline and dedication of the two girls during the
vigorous and intense training process. To prepare for the massive event
the two girls practice outdoors (even in the coldest winter months) on
a daily basis, repeating the same moves hour after hour on concrete
lots, until they have achieved perfection. In addition, Daniel Gordon
also spends time with the girls’ families. This makes for a surprisingly
candid view of even the most mundane aspects of North Korean culture.
9 North Korea’s official sports policy is based on a speech Kim Jong Il
gave on 19 May 1996 to officials working in sport and physical
education. Three years later, it became the country’s official sports
policy.
10 Kim Jong Il himself did not attend the military parade generating world-
wide speculation about his health. He also did not appear in the May
Day stadium for the 2008 mass gymnastic games.
11 Despite the rising tensions on the Korean peninsula caused by the
testing of nuclear missiles by North Korea the official North Korean
news agency, KCNA, announced in April 2009 that the next mass games
will in fact take place from 10 August to 30 September 2009.
Information provided by a few specialist North Korea travel agencies
suggests that interest so far is fairly limited.
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